Gods CHANGE. In colonial Peru, native Americans merged motherly eoddesses with the catholic Mary; later in India， Ramakrishna and his followers devoted themselves to a universalized Kali; more recently still, Jewish mystics have interpreted the masculine "Adonai" as a femi nine "Shechmah." No matter how justified as reclamations of a truer past, such transformations are inexplicable outside the complex polit ical and economic pressures of their times. For, as countless scholars have noted, it is through redefinine their gods that people redefine themselves, their values, and their communities1 -and, in the process, negotiate the rocky shoals of political， social， and economic change.
The proliferation of imperial kami in the wake of the Meiji Restora tion constitutes one more example of this widespread human process, in w hich priests o f preexisting deities redefined their gods in a rapidly ch anging world. The separation of kami and buddhas (shinbutsu b u n ri 神仏分离隹） ，a n d the establishment of modern Shinto that it initiated, marked one of the sharpest breaks in the religious history of Japan. Longstanding doctrines, practices, and institutions came under often violent attack. "Buddhism" and "Shinto" became distinct intellectual and institutional entities. The Meiji state emerged, bolstered by an elaborate structure of priests, shrines, and patriotic teachings. Even these epochal transformations, however, grew out of behavior repeated countless times in the past, as ritualists reliant upon the support of one set o f sponsors w orked to survive a n d prosper th ro ugh the transi tion to the next, redefining their gods to do so.
Such transformation through accommodation is a twofold process. First, religious practitioners seek political recoenition; then, having established their institutional right to exist，they pursue economic security. When both authority and wealth are held m a sinele， lordly hand, the strategy is simple: ally with the ruler. As political and eco nomic power diverge, however, the cash of commoners increasingly plays a role. Through the adjustments of the priests, then, srods soon conform to the politics and people of their time.
The loyalist coup of January 1868 set in motion a series of political and economic accommodations that would change the eods of mod ern Japan. Within just a few years, priests at sacred sites ranging from tiny roadside altars to sprawling mountain complexes renamed the objects of their prayers. By invoking new identities for the sacred pow ers, they removed them from the esoteric pantheon of bodhisattvas, kami, avatars, and euardian kings that had hitherto sustained a com plex system of divination, healing, and protective magic. Instead, they placed them within a world of ancient, creator deities linked to an august, imperial past. Between 1868 and 1874, priests at minor and prominent sites alike aligned themselves with the newly ascendant political authorities, ensuring their survival and, indeed， prosperity by linking the reputations of their eods to the fledgling imperial regime. After the consolidation of the Meiji state, they then turned aeain to the demands of the people. In doing so, they created the shrinesand the kami-of modern Shinto. m uch o f their work with the insight that societies make gods in their image, as their reflection, or as beings to forge unity out of diverse individuals. Historians and scholars of religion have elaborated upon this insight ever since.
The P o litics o f C om bination
The centuries from the O nin War until the consolidation of the Tokugawa-led bakuhan 幕藩 order in the seventeenth century were plagued by repeated military and political upheaval. Rulers conquered new territories, relied upon new ritualists to help them legitimate their rule, then gave way to other rulers and ritualists in turn. There is evi dence that during the late sixteenth century, for instance, Oda Nobunaga sponsored the cult and the priest of Gozu Tenno 牛 頭天王， identifying himself with the powers of the Bull-Headed Heavenly King (Akagi 1991) . In a similarly symbiotic relationship, Toyotomi Hideyoshi's advisors worked with the head of the Yoshida priestly family, Yoshida Kanemi 吉田兼見，to enshrine the ruler after his death as Toyokuni Daimyojin 豊国大明神 (Scheid forthcoming) . O n the island of Shikoku, the Tosa warlord Chosokabe Motochika 長宗我咅R元親 introduced his own ritualists into conquered territories, sponsoring rites to the 1 hirty Protecting Deities (s a n ju b a n jtn 二十番ネ中) of the L o tu s Sutra. When a vassal of Hideyoshi ousted Chosokabe, the priests proposed replacing the Thirty Deities with a shrine to the guardian king Konpira 金 ®祿 instead (M a ts u b a ra 1987， p. 63). G iven the volatile politics o f the years from 1467 to lb65， it should come as no surprise that, according to one count, more than ninety per cent of temples extant during the Tokugawa era had been either founded or rebuilt during this tumul tuous time (Tamamuro 1962， p. 32) .
As befit institutions established to pray for military victory, prosper ity, or peace-in other words, for protection of the realm ( chingo kokka 鎮護国豕） 一 many of these temples performed kito (祈祷） ：r it u a l prayers for practical benefits. Esoteric priests and practitioners of mountain worship ( shugenja f t^) petitioned the deities for health, safety, and other popular concerns. In the midst of ongoing war, both lords seek ing to euard their domains, and villagers seeking protection or escape, valued and commissioned the prayers of such priests.
With the rise of Tokueawa Ieyasu to unrivaled power throughout the islands， the m ost p ro m in e n t religious professionals o f this kito-style worship vied to ally themselves with the new reeime just as other ritu alists throughout the provinces had secured sponsorship from local lords. The success of the Tendai priest Tenkai 天 海 (1536-1643) in identifyine a deified Ieyasu with the sun and sun goddess Amaterasu confirmed the dominance of combinatory thought and practice in the ideological support structure of the emerging bakuhan system. Tenkai and his sponsors thus established the ideological foundations of the Tokugawa regime upon precedents long utilized by Japanese rulers and sanctified by ancient history.
Many of the oldest texts known in Japan revealed a world of com bined deities. Sutras from India displayed a pattern of association in which Indian gods (k a m i # ) became guardians of Buddhist teachings. Histories within Japan supported combination or association as a strat egy for political legitimation.2 Indeed, the first reference in the official histories to the Buddhist affiliation of a local, Japanese kami occurred amid the contested introduction of new, combinatory strategies of imperial legitimation. In the middle of the eighth century, Emperor Shomu and his Buddhist supporters built the Todai-ji and its Great Buddha to bolster imperial prestige, identifying the emperor not only with Amaterasu but also as a manifestation of the Cosmic Buddha cen tral to esoteric thought. According to the Shoku N ih o n g i 続日本糸己，th e kami Hachiman ノ V幡， w h o se cult in Kyushu already included Buddhist elements, supported this endeavor with donations and oracles-a ded ication to the Buddhist ideological proeram that was eventually rewarded with the erantine o f the title "b re a t Bodhisattva" (daibosatsu 大菩薩）to the deity (Bender 1979) . Such merging of kami and Bud dhist identities was not limited to the realm of imperial politics. Eso teric ascetics and magicians identified powerful beings of the land with a variety of minor Buddhist deities， linking the god of Gion 抵園 with both the kami Susano'o and the bull-headed i^ozu Tenno, for example, or the deity of Mt. Kinpu 金峰山 with a new, esoteric avatar, Za6 G ongen蔵王権現.
In the early ninth century, the priests Kukai and Saicho provided both doctrinal and institutional support for these syntheses as they established teaching and meditation centers in mountain retreats and turned to local deities (kami) to protect them. Over the years, scholars at both Mt. Koya and Mt. Hiei worked to understand the relationship between local kami and the larger Buddhist cosmology. They devel oped theories such as Ryobu Shinto, linking kami to the deities of the Shingon mandalas, and Sanno or Hie Sninto, identiiying the kami of Mt. Hiei w ith the buddha Sakyamuni, preacher o f the Lotus Sutra. Kami ritualists of the Yoshida school continued this logic of multiple identities, confirming the basic ideas of combination and manifesta tion even as they altered the details.
This acceptance of multiple identities, in which one deity could be seen as a manifestation of another, helped ritualists secure their shrines and temples within larger systems of meaning supportive of their political sponsors. Beginning in the fourteenth century, for 2 G r a p a rd (1988) c o n v in c in g ly set this process o f 'c o m b in a t io n ' a n d 'a s s o c ia tio n 5 w ith in th e contexts o f p o litic a l structures, w h ile R e a d e r a n d Tanabe (1998) set it in th e c o n te x t o f practical benefits.
instance, members of both the Yoshida school of Shinto and the Hokke (Lotus or Nichiren) sect espoused a system of correlations known as the Thirty Protecting Deities that emerged from Tendai thought.3 Loosely based on beings thought to protect the Lotus S utra on each of the thirty days of the month, these Thirty Deities merged kami with buddhas for protection of the directions， the ruler's castle, the imperial court, and other sites. Thus, the imperial kami Amaterasu was associated with Kannon, Dainichi, or Sakyamuni Buddha and the tenth day of the month, while Hachiman (as both kami and buddha) was linked to the eleventh day. Likewise， the kami Gion Daimyojin in the capital, identified with the guardian king Gozu Tenno, protected the twenty-fourth day of each m onth.4 Such equivalencies tied the time and space of both everyday existence and supernatural power to an intimately linked cosmology that merged kami and buddhas into a seamless whole. This system，although only intermittently visible to the everyday layman, both underlay many of the divinatory, healing, and magical practices of the time and situated them within a structure supportive of the political rulers. It was through a similar kind of combinatory thought that the Tendai priest Tenkai, and the third shogun, Iemitsu， legitimized the Tokugawa regime. After Ieyasu5s death, they enshrined the first shogun at Mt. Nikko and identified him for worship as Tosho Daigongen 東照大権現，th e Great Avatar that shines in the East, thus asso ciating the founder of the shogunate with both the ancestor of the imperial house, the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, and the i^reat Sun Cos mic Buddha, thought to encompass all of existence. Tenkai dubbed the combinatory doctrine that justified this cult uSanno Ichijitsu Shint 6 ， " or the "One True Shinto of (Hie) S a n n 6 ， " clearly linking it to the great Tendai center of Mt. Hiei (Ooms 1985, pp. 173-83) .
In the ensuing years, Tendai and other Buddhist lineages came to occupy an established place in the Tokugawa system. The third shogun, Iemitsu, established a twofold system of relieious control intended to root out sects such as Ikko, Fujufuse and, of course, Christianity, wmch all refused to acknowledge the ultimate authority of the govern ment. The system of mandatory population registration at temples vir tually guaranteed the livelihood of priests who performed funerals. Ihose ritualists who relied more upon the miraculous reputation of their gods-performine k ito to deities of often indeterminate identi ty w e r e forced to affiliate with a recognized denomination, acceding to the oversight of a main temple of the ^hmeon, Tendai, or other denominations. Due to the insularity and instability of the Shinto hous es, as well as the broader institutional advantages of Buddhism under the shogunate, priests of local kami as well as independent diviners, healers, and ascetics found it advantageous to obtain licenses and recognition as betto 另 リ 当 or shaso 社僧 一 Buddhist-credentialed priests of shrines to the minor combinatory deities of the esoteric pantheon (Takano 1989， pp. 280-81) . Many of these practitioners received cre dentials n o t only from a B u d d h ist d e n o m in a tio n b u t from a Shugendo or Shinto lineage as well， thus acquiring both institutional and doctrinal support for the divination, healine. and magic that relied u p o n com binatory ideas and provided their livelihoods (Togawa 1969, p. 10).
Not only did registration temples stand in every village in the land, but villagers also enjoyed access to the rituals of kito temples throuehout their lives, with the great avatar Tosho Daigongen answering the prayers of the shoguns. Tendai, ^hmgon, Nicmren，Shugendo, and other lineages known for their kito thus prospered under the Tokugawa resrime, as did the gongen 権現，my do 明王，a n d similar combinatory deities that they enshrined. Continuing the intellectual project of ear lier centuries, scholars studied the role of local kami (Shinto) to understand the dynamics of k ito and their wonder-working, comomatory eods. Intra-institutional rivalries added fuel to their research. Priests and altars to both kami and buddhas coexisted, with Buddhist temples (jm g H ji 神呂与^ alongside shrines, and guardian kami (chinju n o k a m i 鎮寸个申) within monasteries. Rival ritualists thus jostled for influence, each seeking sponsors or theories to support his own posi tion as temples and shrines alike faced new challenges in the chang ing context of the early modern era. Indeed，the role of kami and buddhas, of teachings, and of priests, came increasingly under scrutiny as social and economic issues turned attention away from the legitima tion or lordly rule to the maintenance oi it.
Gods a nd Policy
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Tokugawa shoguns and domainal lords presided over a land challeneed more by drought and disease than by war and invasion. As the coins of the gov erning houses found their way to the purses of those they ruled, con cerns for economic stability overshadowed the need for military protection. XzYo-lineaee institutions, at the center of both political ldeo Iosy a n d p o p u lar worship, figured prom in e n tly in the solutions p ro posed.
Within decades of the shogunate5 s institutionalization of Buddhist privilege in the seventeenth century, economic and political advisors to select domainal lords already targeted the "wastefulness" of Bud dhist temples in their proposed economic reforms. Some suggested a streamlined system of only one temple per village, devoted to funer ary services and population registration， instead of the myriad sites where residents prayed for practical benefits. Administrators of the Mito domain, in particular, embarked in 1663 on a three-decades-long campaign to abolish purportedly redundant temples, primarily those with a constituency based upon the performance of kito: they encour aged esoteric priests of such institutions to redefine themselves as officiants of the shrines of local kami.5 Economic retrenchment poli cies elsewhere prompted criticism of kito for distracting people from laboring for the prosperity of their lord and domain. Between 1666 and 1675 in the Okayama domain， Kumazawa Banzan and his follow ers urged the suppression of esoteric practitioners who, they said, preyed upon the lower classes, accumulating untoward wealth by telling them that they could perform kito to avoid the curses of "illness, disaster, and possession by fo x e s .， ， 6 Tamamuro Fumio has calculated that in the Okayama domain, ninety-seven per cent of all abolished temples in the seventeenth century belonged to the com binatory, kitdlineage denominations of Shingon, Tendai, and Hokke (Nichiren) (Tam a m u r o 1989，p. 345). In effect，domainal reformers sought to remove the "misleading" claims of k ito from the landscape altogether.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this theme of the wastefulness of ^zYo-style worship dominated Confucian strate gies for reform, whether critics focused on the temples， occupation of valuable land, their extraction of hard-earned resources from believ ers, or their unprofitable reliance on magic instead of human effort. In 1833，for instance, an influential work on political economy attacked Buddhism as "u s e le s s ， ， ， its priests as "s e lfis h ， " and its rites for practical benefits as "wasteful"一 criticisms that, by then, h a d becom e commonplace.7 When the Satsuma domain sought to follow M it o ， s lead m closing temples in the late 1850s, for instance, it began by clos ing the largest religious institution in the domain: the Shingon tem ple Dajo-in (Ketelaar 1990， p. 57) . XzYo-lineage institutions thus bore the brunt of attacks rooted in Neo-Confucian economic，utilitarian, and moralistic policies.
While the Confucian advisors of those few domains mounted their attacks, hoping to shore up the finances of their lo r d s ，a second group of people-ritualists at sites throughout the countryw orked instead to take advantage of the shifting economic balance. K ito priests often lacked stable income from registered parishioners, but they con trolled a potentially more lucrative asset: the reputation of their god for performing miraculous feats. At the height of shogunal influence in the seventeenth century, many priests parlayed such reputations into privileges from their domainal lord and，ultimately, the shogunate， receiving land grants (s h u in c h i 朱PP地）from the bakufu 幕府 that provided a modest basis of econom ic stability. As the bakufu and han 藩 faced straitened circumstances during the eighteenth and nine teenth centuries, however, priests who relied upon official patronage of prayer rituals were forced to seek additional sources of revenue. Ih e ir solution: to tap the growing wealth oi the marketplace, selling their rituals to prosperous farmers and merchants, shippers and pro ducers.
The 如^■performing priests thus turned their attention to the wealth of commoners, sending representatives beyond domainal bor ders to advertise the efficacy of their gods. Shugenja from Dewa 出习习， Konpira, and Akiba Daigongen 秋葉大権現 joined oshi 御師 from Ise on the road, selling amulets to believers around the country and encouraeine them to make a pilgrimage themselves. It was in part to facili tate such promotion that many priests sought sponsorship from an increasingly assertive imperial court. Not only would imperial recogni tion attract the patronage of courtiers, but it would confer wider visi bility throughout the land. Moreover, the emperor could grant legal monopolies, protecting the recipient's right to raise money in the name of his god through the display of images or the sale of amulets-an im portant defense aeainst the tactics of competitors and frauds (Takano 1989， pp. 117-24) . In seeking security in the marketplace of worship, then, ritualists increasingly wooed imperial favor. During the late eighteenth century in particular, they identified their gods with imperial kami such as Susano'o or Miwa, with imperial heroes such as Yamato Takeru， or with emperors such as Sutokuin, Nintoku， or Ojin (Hachiman) (Inoue 1993) . By advertising these imperial affiliations in local histories and gazetteers, the priests and their allies found favor with the court, enhanced their prestige with the populace, and ensured their continued prosperity.
The growine literature in support oi imperial identities proved indispensable to a third network of reformers: the nativists. Amidst the foreign and domestic tensions of the 1790s and early 1800s， Motoori Norinaga and his disciples found the solution to society's problems in the powers of the gods. Kami shaped the course of events, they asserted. Yet, worried Hirata Atsutane, the most powerful deities had been offended by misguided worship according to foreign, usually Buddhist, rites. Using time-honored texts to identify the pow erful kami purportedly sullied by combinatory names and rituals, Hirata and his followers railed against diviners, shamans, and the like "who do not know the true way of the world ... who delude people into [imitating] the sideways scuttling of c r a b s .， ， 8
Fixated on overcoming the deluded esotericism of the "middle ages"
中古）to reclaim the pure essence of an "ancient past" (oko 往古) ， Hirata worked to unearth the original kami of popular and powerful sites. Adding his voice to local histories that hinted at impe rial identities for wonder-working eods， Hirata analyzed histories and gazetteers to demonstrate how "vulgar diviners ... misled the people" at Gion Shrine, identirying the kami Susano5 o as the Buddhist guardian and calendrical deity, Gozu Tenno.9 He consulted "secret transmissions" as well as contemporary miracle tales to identify the vastly pop ular Konpira Daigoneen as a dual enshrinement of both the creator kami and ruler of all the gods, Okuninushi, and the spirit of the twelfthcentury emperor, Sutoku.10 In these and other works, Hirata dilieently excavated purportedly original gods by identifying their powers with the Aee of the Kami narrated in the ancient, imperial texts. For Hirata and his followers, these kami were not so much to be worshiped as grantors of contemporary benefits but to be revered as creators of the land, protectors of its people, and guardians of moral behavior.1 1 Writ ing amidst circulating rumors of foreign ships siehted off the coasts, Hirata conveyed the urgency of purifying worship of both foreign and "vulgar" elements, implying that peace, prosperity, and protection from the foreign threat would be possible only when all kami were worshiped according to the ancient rituals he identified as the pure Way of the Gods (Shinto). Confronted by a foreign threat at sea and economic instability on land， educated people throughout the coun tryside welcomed Hirata5 s theories, attracted to both their promise of a comprehensive solution and their assurance of divine protection.
As nativists espoused a purified worship, priests cultivated ties to the imperial court, and domainal advisors counseled retrenchment and reform, the Tokugawa shoguns worked valiantly to maintain the combinatory cult that supported their regime. The twelfth shogun, Ieyoshi, in particular, when he sought to reassert shogunal authority over the increasingly autonomous domains in the midst of the Tempo crisis in 1843， revived the symbolic official procession to worship at Nikko Toshogu, site of the deified Ieyasu associated with the imperial sun goddess ( B o l i t h o 1989， pp. 152-53). With symbolism from all tra ditions combined into one, the shoguns and their advisors worked to include worshippers of kami and buddhas alongside diviners, philoso phers, and shugenja in support of their faltering regime. At Nikko, at least, they sought to keep the powers of kito associated with the shogu nal government.
By 1867， the centrality of the gods in political life had become strik ingly evident. Nativist poets crisscrossed the country advocating a return to an ancient and sacred past. Domainal advisors criticized the extravagances of worship. Emperor Komei weighed in by commission ing prayers and conferring titles, simultaneously raising the profile of both prayer sites a n d the im perial court (F ukuchi 1974， pp. 229-40) .12
XzYo-lineage priests wooed the patronage of commoners who, in 1867， found themselves caught up in a flurry of magical and political prom ises, celebrating both the falling of amulets from the sky and vague suggestions of a forthcoming change in the political order. The power of k ito had become unmoored from shogunal supremacy: the legit imizing authority of the wonder-working gods stood open to whoever could claim it.
A ncient, Im p e ria l S hinto
In many ways, the months surrounding the loyalist coup of early 1868 resembled the years of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth cen turies. No one could confidently predict the ultimate outcome of the imperial takeover. Many ritualists found themselves and their institu tions in the path of occupying forces; others heard of fighting only months afterward. But all were forced to make a decision-to wager on the long-term success or failure of the upstart loyalists and, based upon that wager, determine how best to cultivate the favor, and thus the sponsorship, of the ultimate victor. Depending upon the particular 12 Takano Toshihiko emphasizes a shift in the bakumatsu period from the bakufu to the emperor as the authority who ordered prayers, similar to an earlier shift in the fourteenth century from the kuge to the buke (Ta k a n o 1989, p. 279).
position of each, every priest chose differently, forming alternative plans and possible solutions.
The victorious loyalists at least made the decisions clear-cut. Like Tenkai and countless ritualists before them, nativist supporters of the coup worked to secure privileges, status, and an influential role for themselves by putting their scholarship to work in the interest of the new leaders. They articulated an archaic, imperial ideal that sought to bypass the "middle ages," reaching back to the origins of the ancient im p e ria l state fo r b o th the le g itim iz in g ra tio n a le a n d -at least at first-the structure of the fledgline government. Well aware of the need for priests around the country to support the new regime volun tarily, the leaders of the coup and their nativist supporters clarified not only the actions that would gain priests political favor, but the cri teria that would be used to judge them.
The first task of the new leaders was to establish the legitimacy of the new regime, a task for which nativist scholars and their allies in the imperial court came well prepared. The nativists thus took the ini tiative in early government announcements, helping to construct a rationale for the coup. They established a rhetoric of imperial restora tion, proclaiming the reconstruction of an idealized past, when the first emperor, Jinmu, ruled according to the will of his divine ancestor, Amaterasu. Thus, when loyalists seized control of the imperial palace on 3 January 1868 (Keio 3.12.9), they proclaimed the "revival of king ly rule" ( osei fu k k o ) "based upon the origins of Jinm u 5 s found ing work, and washing away contaminated customs"一 a policy that they elaborated three months later, amid the fighting that ensued, as "returning to ... unity of rite and ru le .， '13 W ithin days, the new claimants to rule embarked upon an ambitious project designed both to make such ancient purity possible and to discredit the combinatory ideas that had allowed the Tokugawa to usurp imperial power. They began to issue a series of edicts to "separate the kami from the buddhas" {sh in bu tsu b u n ri rei ネ申仏分离隹令) ， meant to ensure the worship of nativist kami through rituals carefully purged of all foreien "contamination."
O n 9 April 1868 (Keio 4.3.17)，the new rulers began elucidating this process oi identifying the powerful gods of the land solely with imperial kami, and thus solely with imperial rule. The Office of Rites ord e re d the p u rific a tio n o f all shrines o f the k a m i (jinja 神社）by decreeing the laicization oi the priests with Buddhist credentials ( betto or shaso) who served at them. This was to be the first step in "cleansing the evil customs of old and restoring kingly r u le .， ， 14 Since only a few gods could unequivocally be identified as kami, however, the Dajokan clarified this order eleven days later: "Since the m id d le ages ( chuko) , not a few shrines { jin ja ) have been called by Buddhist terms fitted to the names of the kami, such as the various avatars (gongen) or Gozu Tenno.5 ,1 5 This edict directly attacked the legitimizing deification of the Tokugawa family-one of the most prom inent avatars, Tosho Daigongen-and the combinatory logic that could justify rule not only by the Tokugawa but by Hideyoshi, Nobunaga, and, in effect， anyone other than the emperor himself. The edict comm anded shrines {jinja) to subm it evidence o f their origins a n d their links to the imperial house, clarifying both the ancient and the imperial basis of their legitimacy. "Shrines" with Buddhist images as their main objects of worship were dealt with even more summarily: all Buddhist images, as well as temple gongs, bells, and other Buddhist im ple ments, were to be removed from the grounds.16 The authorities had clearly enunciated a policy of purifying both the political order and its sacred supports of the "contaminating," combinatory customs that had allowed shoguns to rule in the emperor's stead. In a break from earlier regimes, the loyalists of 1868 would not be satisfied with the addition of yet another, convenient identity to preexisting gods. Instead, they would insist on the discarding and delegitimation of all other identities-leaving only the kami, and imperial rule, supreme.
During the following months, as ritualists disputed whether or not their institutions belonged to the category of " f i n j a ， " thereby putting off the need for change, nativists in the government clarified their intentions. First and foremost, they singled out the Tendai-derived school of Sanno Shinto that underlay the cult of Tosho Daigongen. Only days after the edict banning Buddhist images at kami shrines, an official of the Office of Rites led a group of violent activists in burning scrolls, decapitating images, and otherwise "purifying" the site of Hie Sanno.17 The men in the Dajokan then turned their attention to the Buddhist category of bodhisattvas (bosatsu) ， soon focusing in particu lar on Hachiman, the purported origin of the combinatory trend. Dis regarding the legend that the kami itself had sought a Buddhist affiliation, the rulers forbade references to the bodhisattva Hachiman (Hachiman Bosatsu), insisting upon the kami identity of this promi nent god and deified emperor. A government directive of 1 December 1868 (Meiji 1.10.18) to the main temples of the Hokke sect made clear that powerful kami were to be associated only with the new, imperial regime. Aimed at the cult of the 1 hirty Protecting Deities-that Tendai-influenced synthesis espoused by the combinatory traditions of both the Hokke sect and Yoshida Shinto-the order emphasized that the identities of the impe rial kami espoused by the state should not be exploited for personal or sectarian purposes. "O n the occasion of the restoration of imperial rule and the ensuing reforms， the confusing of kami and buddhas was a b o lis h e d ， ， ， s ta te d the edict.
However, this [Hokke] sect has long worshiped the imperial ancestral kami and other gods, writing the sacred names of the Great Imperial Kami Amaterasu, the Great Kami Hachiman, and others in something they call a mandala， and placing the sacred names on corpses, as well as on sutras and hats. Truly, this is an unspeakable occurrence and has been forbidden. Convey to all branch temples of the sect that they cannot adul terate any name of the kami.19
No name of an imperial kami was to be polluted by contact with the dead or used in other Buddhist or magical contexts. The sacred, legitimizing symbols of the new, imperial state were to be reserved for "purified," state-recognized uses, instilling reverence toward the imperial regime.
The new Meiji leaders had, at least on paper, enunciated a sacro sanct cult of imperial kami to legitimize rule in the name of the emperor alone. As repeated in edicts throughout the year, they sought to eliminate both combinatory practices and the political structures they supported. Denying the sutra-based identities of the gods, avatars, and guardian kings, they tied the most powerful deities instead to the oldest histories focused on the imperial house, simulta neously relegating the miracles of k ito to a past Age of the Gods. In so doing, they established (at least in theory) the divinely mandated legitimacy of the new, imperial regime while discrediting any potential opposition supported by either miraculous benefits or uncondoned association with imperial symbols. In the halls of state ideology, the esotericism of k ito fell to the nativism of imperial history.
Strategies f o r S u rv iv a l
As men in the fledgling imperial government worked to clarify the basis of their exclusive right to rule, priests and ritualists around the country maneuvered to survive and, if possible, prosper through the uncertainties or the time. Because of the centrality of the gods in the fight for legitimacy, no one could simply stand on the sidelines. Instead， all ritualists-and the priests of 紛^"performing institutions in particular-faced the troublesome task oi balancing the exigencies of the present with their prognostications of the future. Responding to the problems of a shaky political system， military threat, and economic instability, many priests actively sought to redefine the multifaceted deities worshiped at their institutions, at least temporarily, in order to align themselves with the unitary ideology proclaimed by the new men in power.
Just as ritualists in earlier eras responded to military conquest by appealing to the victorious rulers, so too did their successors in the nineteenth century. As loyalist forces marched through eastern Japan during late 1867 and early 1868, priests at prominent worsnip sites in their path began to consider the advantages of appealing to the con quering troops.20 (See Map.) As early as 21 January 1868 (Keio 3.12.27), for instance, three months after loyalist forces emerged vic torious at nearby Hamamatsu, and less than a month after the Meiji coup, one shugenja from the Soto Shugendo center of Akiba Gongen established a branch enshrinement of the aeity， renounced his Bud dhist affiliation to become a ^hmto priest, and received imperial rank from the court.21 Likewise, there is evidence that in occupied Kyoto itself, both a month after the battle of Toba-Fushimi and a month before the Dajokan^ attack on gongen and Gozu Tenno, the main Buddhist ritualist at Kanjin-in 感神院， also known as Lrion Shrine, pre emptively shed his Buddhist robes to transform nimself into a priest of the kam i (Kubota 1974， pp. 6-7).
By the later stages of the Boshin War, after the new imperial eovernment had clarified the revolutionary ritual purity demanded of those wishing to affiliate with the new regime, such appeasements came to require more than the simple invocation of a kami-related identity. Ambitious ritualists needed to remove their sites and deities from the hitherto combinatory cosmology of avatars and essences (h o n ji 本 地 ），instead placing them exclusively within an imperial framework linked back to the oldest native texts. Thus, three months after having declared his Shinto id e n tity a n d two months after the 20 I would like to thank Conrad Totman for his helpful comments highlighting the s ig n ifican ce o f this d y n a m ic .
21 "Akibadera haiki no tenmatsu， " pp. 407-8, and Takayanagi Koju, "Akibasan shinbutsu b u n r i jik e n sh ir a b e k a k i," in T su ji et a l . 1984, p . 479. government edict banning the use of the name Gozu Tenno for the enshrined deity~the recently converted ka n n u sh i of Gion Shrine per force renamed his institution. No longer could it be the shrine of "G io n ， ， ， r e fe r r in g to thejeta grove monastery built for the historical Bud dha in India. Nor could it boast the name "K a n jin -in ， " invoking as it did a subsidiary institutional identity ( in 院 ）long associated with com binatory sites. Instead, the priest， with encouragement from the new rulers, created a new name for the shrine, adopting a local place name that appeared, linked to both sacred ana imperial powers, in the M a n 'y d s h u and other ancient texts: Yasaka ノ〈坂 (Kubota 1974， pp. 3-12) .22
As news of the government's separation policy gradually spread beyond the vicinity of Kyoto, hindered at times by domainal lords still skeptical of or opposed to the new regime, other ritualists likewise 22 Kubota also shows how Gion Shrines elsewhere in the country adopted similar names invoking local identities from the ancient texts.
learned that neither claims to imperial ties nor mere monetary sup port of the coup could ensure survival. Renunciation of combinatory titles and adoption of an ancient， mythic name were also required. In Shikoku, for instance, where loyalist forces had already confiscated the lands of Konpira Daigongen， the betto of Konko-in 金光院 sought to save his institution and sidestep the issue of conversion by pledging funds to defray imperial expenses.23 When this strategy tailed, however, and allies in the capital impressed upon him the urgency of joining the nativist camp, the betto renounced his Buddhist ties on 2 Aueust 1868 (Keio 4.6.14)，declaring himself a priest o f the kam i, a n d -on paper at least~transforming Konpira Daigongen into the Great Kami Kotohira 金ZJitiP大ネ申. In doing so, he drew upon the detailed analyses of none other than Hirata Atsutane mmseli， identifying the new Koto hira as a joint enshrinement of Omononusni (also known as Okuni nushi) and the spirit of Emperor Sutoku. At the same time, the newly converted priest emphasized to the government both the historical privileges accorded by emperors to the god and the role of the deity in protecting the realm. In return, the laicized betto requested his appointment as head priest ( d a io u ii 大呂 ロ ]) of the site and confirma tion of Kotohira5 s special status as a "shrine for imperial prayer" ( chokusai no yashiro 動祭の社) .24 His conversion of Konpira Daigongen to a site for kami worship clearly constituted part of a larger bid to retain control over his institution and secure the protection and privi leges of the new government: the betto found in conversion a way to avoid ceding his authority to the occupying, loyalist forces.
similarly, at Hikosan 英彦山， a prominent Shugendo center near Fukuoka, the zasu ) 坐王 of Reisen-ji initially pursued a strategy of emphasizing imperial ties in lieu of conversion. In response to news of the separation edicts that reached him in March 1869, the zasu tried to maintain the combinatory traditions of his independent Shugendo stronghold by emphasizing its imperial connections, namely its desienation as an imperial prayer site ( chokum nsho 勒原頁所）in 1863.Ih e government immediately replied that ir he and the other shugenja did n o t eive u p their B u d dhist identities (i.e., as shaso) , then they m ust leave the service of the kami, and thus, Mt. Hiko itself. In the ensuing months, the shugenja thus reestablished themselves as priests (e.g., negi) of the shrine (Nagano 1978， pp. 891-912) .
Farther north, at the Shugendo center of Dewa Sanzan, after loyal ist troops had defeated forces in nearby Tsuruoka, and after receiving news o f the separation edicts from the now loyal d o m a in ，the betto o f Nichigetsu-ji 日月寺 on Mt. Haguro held a meeting of more than thirty shugen ja in July of 1869 (Meiji 2.6). After long deliberation, they decided to throw their lot in with the new eovernment, took new names and announced their conversion to service of the kami-a decision shaped not only by their evaluation of the political expediency of the move, but by concerns over economic stability in the wake of confiscation of their land, and by the complicated politics of rivalries among ritualists on the three mountains of the complex. A proactive conversion, in other words, mieht offer the ritualists of the newly named Dewa Shrine more privileges than their rivals-a strategy that d id ， in d e e d ， pay o ff in subsequent years (Togawa 1969， pp. 42-43) .
Thus, the spread of the military and political authority of the new government throughout the country prompted ritualists to reevaluate their cosmological affiliation with the bakuhan order. Having repeatedly added new deities at their sites, or added new identities to existing gods over the years, it did not seem entirely impossible to entertain the idea of making similar alterations yet aeain. What differed in 18b8, however, was the need not only to supplant but to actively renounce their earlier interpretations of sacred power. Adoption of a kami identity now meant adhering to the imperial eods alone.
The change of government offered enough opportunities to make even such sacrifice attractive. By cultivating an alliance with the new regime through support oi its ideological and cosmological agenda, a single man like the lone shugenja of Akiba Gongen or the betto of Dewa Sanzan could establish the groundwork that might enable him to seize institutional control from rivals who stubbornly retained their Bud dhist identities.25 Or, for those already in positions of dominance at their institutions such as the betto of Konpira Daigongen or the zasu of Hikosan, invocation of nativist kami identities promised the continua tion of autonomous privileges held under the previous regime. In short, for the benefit or both themselves and their institutions, ritual ists throughout Japan actively claimed-at least on paper-to worship only the purified, ancient, and im perial kami of the new, Meiji regime.26
Prerogatives o f the State
While such initial identification with the Way of the Kami made possi ble new privileges under the imperial government, it also paved the way for that government to guide the internal affairs of the new shrines. In short, by appealing to the Meiji rulers, many priests unwit tingly invited government interference. Having transformed their sites into "s h r in e s ， ， ，th e r e b y placing their institutions under the juris diction of the centralizing state, these new priests of the kami found themselves subject to direct regulation by the new men in Tokyo.
Beginning in 1871 and early 1872， leaders in the Dajokan set about undermining the economic and hereditary basis of shrine and temple autonomy in order to strengthen their own authority. By asserting eovernment jurisdiction over shrines and their personnel， then setting up centrally-controlled structures that offered the promise of advance ment to Shinto priests and their shrines, the men in the Dajokan secured the active involvement of priests in a national system of doc trine and ritual. In early 1871 (Meiji 4.1.5)， the Dajokan announced the confiscation of all shrine and temple lands (the former sh uinchi) beyond the most confined sacred precincts, thereby depriving the priests of land-based tax and tribute income. As ritualists at Dewa and elsewhere recognized, this forced them to rely solely upon donations and fees from worshippers-a particular hardship for those combina tory institutions that did not cultivate ongoing ties through funerary rituals.27 Soon, the independence of the new shrines was further com promised when the Dajokan announced a revolution in the legal posi tion of shrines and priests. O n 1 July 1871 (Meiji 4.5.14)， it announced that shrines were for state, not private worship; that priestly offices would therefore be governmental, not hereditary, appointments; and that all shrines would be ranked hierarchically, with the oldest, most imperially connected, and powerful shrines granted imperial or provincial rank (kanpeisha and kokuheisha 国弊社，respectively), with an accompanyine stipend.28
Like other such edicts of the new government，the initial pro nouncem ent had little immediate effect, due to the fragmented administrative jurisdictions around the country. However, two months later, the leaders in Tokyo announced the abolition of the domains and establishment of prefectures, and shortly thereafter began to appoint governors to prefectures throughout the country, supported by newly formed units of prefectural police.29 Between the initiatives of newly appointed governors and the Ministry of Doctrine, officials intent upon carrying out directives from Tokyo soon transformed the nominal authority of the government over Shinto shrines into a more direct control.
Prefectural governors and leaders of the Ministry of Doctrine's Great Teaching Campaign alike secured the ideological, social, and eco nomic support of shrines around the country through an aggressive policy of personnel appointm ent and incentives. Governors from Tokyo arrived in prefectures and immediately began carrying out pre viously issued directives of the state. Not long after the governor arrived in newly formed Hamamatsu Prefecture, for instance, in late 1871，he issued a prefectural edict to the temple of Akiba Gongen that decreed it was actually Akiba Shrine, citing the precedent of the single shugenja who had secured imperial rank for himself when he moved off the mountain five years before. Prefectural officials subse quently oversaw the removal and destruction of all Buddhist images and objects at the shrine as well as the laicization of the Buddhistaffiliated shugenja who remained.30 Where other priests had already announced the Shinto identification of their sites, prefectural gover nors exercised the prerogative to appoint governmental, not hereditary, priests. By assigning dedicated and often locally renowned nativists to the shrines, they ensured that the new priests would work for the com plete "purification" of the sites from within. At Kotohira Shrine in Shikoku, therefore, it was five men appointed by the new governor who finally burned and sold the Buddhist statues and funneled income from the site to the state, decisively and permanently useparating" kami and buddhas on the mountain (Thal 1999). The centraliz ing Meiji state, through such appointments of governors and priests, thus stepped through the door opened by ambitious ritualists seeking to secure their positions.
The process of personnel-based reform only accelerated with the formalization of the Great Teaching Campaign under the auspices of the Ministry of Doctrine. Under this program, ^hmto priests were to serve concurrently as Doctrinal Instructors (kydddshoku 敎導職、 ，r a n k e d and paid according to both the status of their shrines and their attain ment on examinations of nativist, state teachings, and scholarship. Like the Dajokan did with governors, the Ministry of Doctrine, which was responsible for the oversight of the shrines, appointed the highest priests of prominent sites. Thus, new head priests arrived at Dewa and Kotohira Shrine, amone others, with directions to ensure the com 30 "Akibadera haiki no shimatsu， ， ，409-13, and Takayanagi Koju, "Akibasan shinbutsu bunri jiken shirabegaki, " 414-20, in Tsuji et al. 1984. plete conversion of Mt. Dewa and its shugenja to imperial Shinto and to secure the vast donation-based income of Kotohira for the use of the Great Teaching Campaign.3 1
Where local nativists had not already overseen the removal and destruction of Buddhist remnants, these centrally appointed priests set about doing so. The new head priest of Dewa Shrine, for instance, removed and burned the Buddhist images at the site after his arrival in late 1873， then effaced stone inscriptions to the Great Bodhisattva Shoken 照見大菩薩 in 1874， enforcing the "purified" Shinto identity of the deity (T ogaw a 1969，pp. 53-54) . At Hikosan, another eovernment-appointed priest likewise oversaw the disposal of all Buddhist images in mid-1874 (Nagano 1978， Dp. 913-14) . A t the m ajor pilgrimaee sites, the government appointees-aided by the former hereditary priests, now demoted to assistants under their control-also estab lished new lay associations around the national teachings: the Sincere Patriotic Association (Sekishin Hokokukai,赤心幸B国会）at Dewa Shrine and the Reverence Association (Sukei K osha,崇敬貝千土) at Kotohira, for exam ple, ihrougn strategic aDpom tm ents, as well as prom otions based upon demonstrated dedication and nativist qualifications, rep resentatives of the central government took advantage of the nominal authority voluntarily ceded by amoitious ritualists. By incorporating converted priests into the hierarchical incentive structure of Shinto ranks and salaries, Meiji leaders ensured ever more dedication to the rituals and rhetoric of the new regime, enhancing the increasing Indeed， the efforts of the Meiji leaders to harness the miraculous reputations of powerful gods in the service of the state was a remark able success. During the years from 1868 to 1874， a vast number of institutions that focused on the performance of prayer rituals to com binatory, wonder-workine deities disappeared, to be replaced by shrines for the reverence of nativist kami. As Tamamuro Fumio has noted， many of the largest shrines popular today~including Nikko, Yoshino， and Sumiyoshi~were the sites of sprawling Shugendo and Tendai Buddhist temple complexes before 1868 (Tamamuro 1989， p. 352) . O f 136 prom inent Shueendo sites investigated by Nagano Tadashi， more than sixty per cent were either abolished or trans formed into Shinto shrines in the early Meiji era (Nagano 1978，pp. 910-11) . Conversions from ^hueendo created the ranks of new Shinto 31 Tokoyo Nagatane, "Shinky6 soshiki monogatari," in Y a su m a ru and M i y a c h i 1988，p. 387. priests as well. In Yamagata Prefecture, where shugenja admittedly pre dominated, 5,538 of 5,722 Shinto priests surveyed in the late Meiji era (that is, 96.8 per cent) reported that either they or their predecessors had been shugenja (Togawa 1969， p. 9 ). More recently, Murata Yasuo has consulted records of four present-day prefectures, finding that in some regions, such as Saitama and Gunma， esoteric，^zYo-lineage sites constituted the bulk of those temples that disappeared from the Bud dhist rolls.32 The connection with protective prayer was explicitly drawn in Nara， for instance, when a circular in 1869 dictated that all sites associated w ith " c h in ju " or protective deities be id e n tifie d as shrines to the kami (M urata 1999， pp. 24-25) .
This targeting of ^zYo-lineage sites included innumerable shrines dedicated to the kami as well. The combinatory esotericism not only of Buddhist lineages but also of Yoshida Shinto and other schools attracted the ire of nativist purifiers. Hachiman, Gion, and countless other combinatory Shinto shrines thus were forced to abandon their sutras, temple gongs, and performances of kito rituals.
The transformation of Shinto, Buddhist, and Shugendo sites, as well as the predom inance of ^z7o-lineage priests and institutions among the converted ranks， serves as a potent reminder that the "separation of kami and buddhas" entailed not simply a shift from an old Buddhism to a new Shinto. It also redefined ^hmto, Buddhism, and Shugendo, changing their content amid the chaos of conversion. To legitimize the new regime-and to subvert the earlier order-the Meiji leaders invited eager ritualists to redefine their powerful gods and institutions for the sole promotion of the archaic, historicist, imperial cult.
The Ever-Changing Gods
Modifications of the gods did not stop with the adoption of exclusively nativist identities. In f a c t，a fte r ritualists had stripped their combinatory gods down to a purified imperial identity for political purposes, they added back further associations for economic survival. The financially strapped government, once securely established with the help of the kami, shifted its attention away from the shrines, reducing state sup port.33 Priests of the shrines, now confident of their continued exis 32 A c c o r d in g to M u r a ta 5s figures, 7 3 .8 % o f th e a b o lis h e d te m p le s in S a ita m a a n d 6 3 .6% of those in G unm a Prefecture were made up of Tendai, Shingon, and Shugendo institutions alone. Comparable figures for Miyazaki Prefecture and Nagano Prefecture were 37.4% and tence under the Meiji regime, turned to the needs and resources of the people. Like their Tokugawa-era predecessors, they continued to transform their gods， working to enhance the powerful reputations that served as the basis of their popularity and， hence, their prosperity in the ever-changing marketplace of prayer.
First, the priests emphasized not just the ancient genealogies but, once again, the combinatory powers of the gods. Despite their rheto ric, even the government-appointed, nativist priests recognized the economic value of promoting familiar signs and objects of power for this purpose. Thus, despite his dedication to "purifying" the site, the head priest of Dewa Shrine attempted to recruit members for his new lay association from among existing Shugendo parishioners.34 Like wise, at Kotohira Shrine, the Reverence Association capitalized upon the reputations o f amulets blessed and used in esoteric rituals (Thal 1999). At each site， worshippers continued to address the gods by their combinatory names, clearly imputing power to the older titles.
During the recession of the 1880s， priests increasingly found them selves re-incorporating 如^■based associations in order to combat ris ing competition for amulet sales and prayer fees. In 1881, the office of the Home Ministry recognized the renewed trend toward combina tion, permitting the use of the title of ovngen again in exceptional cases.35 After the Sino-Japanese war, ^hmto shrines actively identified with the revival of gongen and Shugendo symbols. Kotohira Shrine, for instance, constructed a new "inner shrine" on the mountain dedicated to a Sningon priest who supposedly turned into a powerful tengu 天狗. Ih is priest-turned-had been worshiped at the site before 1868, b u t now he was enshrined u n d e r a kam i nam e rem iniscent o f the clas sic texts (T h a l 1999).
New associations of the gods have come and gone in the century since. During the Pacific War, priests and textbook writers linked the protective powers of the kami to imperial heroes of the Age of the Gods. When such militaristic icons waned in popularity after 1945， fu n d s fo r co n s e rv atio n c o n t in u e d to flo w to th e im p e r ia l a n d p r o v in c ia l shrines, b u t debates over th e ir e v e n tua l a b o litio n m e a n t th a t lo n g te r m fin a n c ia l s u p p o r t f r o m th e state was n o t g u a r a n te e d (S a k a m o t o 1994, pp. 376-79).
34 As Togawa notes, however, these early efforts were unsuccessful due to the priest's m is u n d e r s ta n d in g o f S h u g e n d o o rg a n iz a tio n s (T o g a w a 1969, p . 63 ).
35 Naimusho ju n 769,13 October 1887, in Shukyd horei ruisan, cited in A k a is h i 1982.
many priests revived combinatory, popular names of the Tokugawa era in order to profit from a wave of nostalgia, or linked the classical identities of the gods, such as Okuninushi, with more popular con structs, such as the Seven Lucky Gods. With each revision of the ori gin tales or legends of their shrines, priests have altered their deities to appeal to new constituents and supporters.36
The gods of Japan, even supposedly ancient and unchanging kami, have thus always been in the process of change. Once freed of the early Meiji politics of imperial exclusivity, priests quickly added new associations to the nativist kami, catering to the demands of worship pers throughout society. As they advertised new rituals, benefits， and indeed identities of the gods, they survived through political, economic， and social change by continuing the centuries-old strategy of combi nation, now less amid the niceties of esoteric cosmology and more within a marketplace of advertising and cultural tourism.
In the past, such strategies focused first on political legitimation and only then on the market. Since the Shinto directive prohibited state sponsorship of Shinto in 1946， however, the politics of legitima tion has become a more democratic politics of the people, to whom priests have turned for both recognition and support.37 Thus, priests have engaged with issues across the political spectrum-advocating environmentalism, promoting the flag, or offering their shrines as a staging ground for populist, nationalist groups. In a world where the distinction between politics and business has become increasingly unclear, the strategies of shrine survival encourage an almost infinite number of potential associations, limited only by the imagination and budgets of ambitious priests. Thus, the multiplying identities of the "pure， ， ， "imperial" kami may serve as a bellwether of the ever-growing diversity of Japanese democracy. They point to a pluralistic Shinto, and a pluralistic nation, constantly in flux.
